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Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics
Sentential context effects on the identification of the Dutch function words te (to) and de (the) were
examined. In Experiment 1, listeners labeled words on a [t3]-[da] continuum more often as te when the
context was te biased {Ikprobeer [?a] schieten [I try to/the shoot]) than when it was de biased (Ikprobeer
[?a] schoenen [I try to/the shoes]). The effect was weaker in slower responses. In Experiment 2,
disambiguation began later, in the second word after [?a]. There was a weak context effect only in the
slower responses. In Experiments 3 and 4, disambiguation occurred on the word before [?a]: There was
no context effect when one set of sentences was used, but there was an effect (larger in the faster
responses) when more sentences were used. Syntactic processing affects word identification only within
a limited time frame. It appears to do so not by influencing lexical access processes through feedback but,
instead, by biasing decision making.
When English listeners hear the ambiguous word [?a], which is
somewhere between to and the, they tend to identify it as to in the
context We tried [7s] go but as the in the context We tried [?s] gold
(Isenberg, Walker, & Ryder, 1980). It might be tempting to think
that this demonstration of contextual involvement in perceptual
decision making is evidence for feedback in the speech recognition
system. This context effect might suggest that there are feedback
mechanisms that act so that higher levels of processing (those
responsible for processing the sentential information) influence
lower levels of processing (those responsible for the initial
acoustic-phonetic processing necessary to provide the higher lev-
els with an input). We argue, however, that sentential context
effects are not evidence for feedback. Indeed, the analysis of the
time course of such effects presented here suggests instead that
there is no feedback in the speech recognition system.
Why, then, are context effects not evidence for feedback? We
first illustrate our answer to this question with a context effect in
speech perception that has been studied quite intensively: the
demonstration of lexical involvement in phonetic categorization
(Burton, Baum, & Blumstein, 1989; Burton & Blumstein, 1995;
Connine, 1990; Connine & Clifton, 1987; Fox, 1984; Ganong,
1980; McQueen, 1991; Miller & Dexter, 1988; Pitt, 1995; Pitt &
Samuel, 1993). Ganong (1980) was the first to show that listeners
tend to label ambiguous phonemes (e.g., alveolar stops on a
continuum between [d] and [t]) in the initial position of word-
nonword (e.g., deep-teep) and nonword-word (e.g., deach-teach)
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contexts so as to form words (e.g., as [d] in deep-teep but as [t] in
deach-teach). Similar effects have been observed when the pho-
nemes that listeners classify are word medial (e.g., [d] and [g] in
cradle-cragle and badel-bagel; Connine, 1990) or word final
(e.g., [s] and [fl in kiss-kish and fiss-fish; McQueen, 1991).
One account of these effects is that there is a feedback loop in
the speech recognition system. In most accounts of spoken word
recognition, lexical knowledge is accessed through prelexical
acoustic-phonetic processes that map the speech signal onto stored
lexical representations. A feedback loop would allow lexical pro-
cesses to modulate those prelexical processes. The top-down word-
to-phoneme connections in the TRACE model (McClelland &
Elman, 1986) instantiate just such a feedback loop. Lexical effects
in categorization could be taken as support for this kind of feed-
back mechanism. The ambiguous signal [?ip], for example, acti-
vates the lexical representation of the word deep, which in turn
feeds support back to the prelexical representation of the phoneme
[d]. The result is more [d] responses in the [?ip] context than in the
[?itj] context (in which feedback produces a bias toward [t]).
There is, however, no need to postulate that there is feedback in
the speech recognition system to be able to explain lexical effects
in phonetic categorization (Massaro & Oden, 1995; McQueen,
1991). Lexical knowledge can influence perceptual decision mak-
ing without influencing prelexical processing. In the Merge model
(McQueen, Norris, & Cutler, 1999; Norris, McQueen, & Cutler,
2000), phonemic decisions are made at a dedicated decision-
making stage that receives input from both prelexical and lexical
levels of processing. Information from these two sources is inte-
grated. The Merge model accounts for lexical effects in categori-
zation as follows. The signal [?ip], for example, activates the
decision units (nodes) for both [d] and [t] through the connections
from the prelexical level to the decision level. The same signal also
activates the word node for deep, which in rum feeds support
forward to the decision node for the phoneme [d], biasing the
decision toward [d]. There will thus be more [d] responses in a
[?ip] context than in a [?itj] context (in which the [t] decision node
receives support from the word node for teach).
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It is therefore possible to account for lexical effects in phonetic
categorization in a model without feedback. The Merge model can
also explain the detailed pattern of lexical context effects in other
tasks that require phonemic decisions and, in fact, can do so better
than models such as TRACE that include feedback loops (Mc-
Queen et al., 1999; Norris et al., 2000; Pitt & McQueen, 1998).
Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of models without feed-
back is that, in such models, context is unable to distort the mental
representation of the perceptual world. Context can certainly in-
fluence the phonemic decisions that listeners make, but it does so
without modulating the prelexical representation of the speech
signal; the coding of what actually occurred in the physical world
is left intact. In contrast, models with feedback run the risk of
hallucinating (Massaro, 1989; Norris et al., 2000). Feedback from
the lexicon acts to change the prelexical representation of the
speech signal, and this, in the extreme case, could result in the
listener hearing a speech sound that was in fact not present in the
physical signal.
Therefore, because models without feedback can account for
lexical context effects, these effects cannot be taken as support for
models with feedback. Effects of sentential context on phonetic
categorization (Borsky, Tuller, & Shapiro, 1998; Connine, 1987;
Connine, Blasko, & Hall, 1991; Miller, Green, & Schermer, 1984),
however, might appear to offer a stronger case for feedback. In
Miller et al.'s (1984) study, for example, listeners heard the sen-
tence frames She needs hot water for the ... and She likes to jog
along the ... with, as the final word, a continuum between bath
and path. Listeners were asked to identify the final word. There
were more bath responses in the semantically congruent hot water
context than in the semantically incongruent jogging context. At
first glance, such a result appears to suggest that the output of the
interpretative processes that compute the semantic plausibility of a
word in the overall meaning of a sentence can influence lower
level processes, either lexical-level processes (biasing the activa-
tion of a word such as bath) or even prelexical processes (biasing
the activation of a representation of the phoneme [b]). Is this not
evidence of feedback?
The answer to this question is again no. Exactly the same
argument applies in the case of sentential context effects as in the
case of lexical context effects. Sentential context can influence the
decision-making process, through which listeners make explicit
perceptual judgments, without also influencing the lexical access
process. On such a view, semantic congruity biases the decision
process such that a congruous word tends to be selected rather than
an incongruous word. But this bias need not influence word
representations at the lexical level or the representations of the
component phonemes of those words at the prelexical level. In
other words, there is no need for feedback.
Detailed analysis of sentential context effects has in fact sug-
gested that these effects are not caused by feedback. Miller et al.
(1984) showed that the effects are susceptible to the demands of
the experimental task. The effect was present when listeners had to
identify both the final word of each sentence and the sentence
frame itself but was absent when listeners had to identify only the
final word of each sentence. This finding suggests that sentential
context influences the decision process (and thus depends on the
nature of that decision) and that sentential context does not exert a
mandatory influence on the recognition process (and thus at least
rules out a strong version of a feedback account in which the
feedback loop is always active).
Connine (1987) examined the reaction times (RTs) of categori-
zation decisions in sentential contexts. She found that responses
were faster when they were consistent with the sentence context
(e.g., a [d] response to the sentence She drives the car with the
[?ent]) than when they were inconsistent (e.g., a [d] response to the
sentence She saw the show in the [?ent]). This RT consistency
effect, however, was found only for endpoint stimuli (e.g., when
the to-be-categorized phoneme was an unambiguous [d] or an
unambiguous [t]), which most listeners labeled correctly most of
the time. It was not found for responses in the most ambiguous
region (at the category boundary), even though there was a sen-
tential context effect (more consistent than inconsistent responses)
at that boundary. This pattern of results is very similar to that
obtained when categorization decisions are biased by a monetary
payoff scheme (e.g., listeners are told they will receive a monetary
reward for correct [d] decisions; Connine & Clifton, 1987). Con-
nine (1987) therefore argued that sentential context effects are also
the result of a bias, and thus that sentential context influences
perceptual decision making rather than the process of speech
encoding. Connine's findings are consistent with those of Samuel
(1981), who examined the effect of sentential context on the
phonemic restoration illusion. In a signal-detection analysis, Sam-
uel (1981) showed that sentential context influenced the bias
measure /3 and also argued that sentential context influences the
decision-making stage rather than the encoding stage.
Thus, the results of Samuel (1981), Miller et al. (1984), Connine
(1987), and Connine et al. (1991) all lead to the same conclusion:
Sentential context influences decision making rather than encod-
ing. This consensus, however, has recently been challenged by
Borsky et al. (1998), who argued that sentential context does
influence the encoding of speech. The results of Borsky et al.
(1998) contradict those of Connine (1987). Borsky et al. presented
listeners with sentences such as The laughing dairyman hurried to
milk the [?ot] in the drafty bam and visual probes (goat or coat) at
the offset of the target word ([?ot]). Listeners were required to
decide whether the visual word matched what they had just heard.
Borsky et al. found a sentential context effect (i.e., more goat
identifications in goat-biased sentences), but, in contrast to Con-
nine (1987), they also found that RTs at the category boundary
were faster for responses that were consistent with the sentence
context than for responses that were inconsistent with the sentence
context. Borsky et al. argued that their results may have been
different from those of Connine (1987) because of several proce-
dural factors, such as the number of sentence contexts.
On the basis of their results, Borsky et al. (1998) claimed that
sentential context influences initial phonological analysis. They
thus argued for a form of feedback in the speech recognition
system by which sentence-level processes modulate phonological
processes (although they did not in fact use the term feedback).
Their argument was that, because sentential context effects show
the same RT pattern as lexical context effects, and because lexical
effects are due to feedback, sentential context effects are also due
to feedback. This argument is unconvincing. First, there is no
standard RT pattern for lexical effects with which sentential effects
can be compared. The sentential effects observed by Borsky et al.
(1998) showed the same RT pattern as lexical effects in word-
initial position (e.g., in deep-teep and deach-teach continua; Con-
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nine & Clifton, 1987; Pitt & Samuel, 1993); that is, consistent
responses were faster than inconsistent responses at the category
boundary but not at the continuum endpoints. This is not the same
pattern as is observed for lexical effects in word-final position
(e.g., in kiss-kish and fiss-fish continua; McQueen, 1991; Pitt &
Samuel, 1993). Word-final lexical effects in fact show the same
RT pattern as that observed for sentential context effects by
Connine (1987); that is, consistent responses are faster than incon-
sistent responses at the continuum endpoints but not at the cate-
gory boundary. Thus, neither sentential nor lexical context effects
show a consistent RT pattern. Second, as we have already argued,
lexical effects are not necessarily due to feedback. The RT effect
at the category boundary observed by Borsky et al. (1998) could be
due to decision-level processes. Semantic congruity could have
biased a decision process, not only such that congruous words
tended to be selected rather than incongruous words but also such
that congruent decisions were made more quickly than incongruent
decisions.
The aim of the present experiments was to distinguish between
these two accounts of sentential context effects: the account based
on a decision bias (Connine, 1987; Samuel, 1981) and the account
based on feedback (Borsky et al., 1998). We therefore examined
the time course of sentential context effects through the use of RT
range analyses in which categorization responses were divided into
fast, medium, and slow RT bins. These analyses have been used
quite extensively to examine the fine detail of the dynamics of
lexical context effects (Burton et al., 1989; Burton & Blumstein,
1995; Fox, 1984; McQueen, 1991; Miller & Dexter, 1988; Pitt,
1995; Pitt & Samuel, 1993).
We reasoned that if sentential context effects are indeed due to
feedback processes, they should be relatively stable over time.
Simulations with the TRACE model reported by McClelland and
Elman (1986, p. 26, Figure 6) and by McClelland (1987, p. 12,
Figure 1.2) show how, in the case of lexical context effects,
feedback builds up over time. In the McClelland (1987) simula-
tions, for example, the input was /dar?/, where 111 was an ambig-
uous phoneme midway between Idl and l\l. It can clearly be seen
that, although the top-down influence of the word dart takes some
time to build up, as more time elapses, the activation of the node
for the lexically consistent phoneme Ixl continues to rise and that
for the /d/ levels off and then falls. The phoneme nodes thus tend
to reflect the pattern of activation at the lexical level. As long as
dart remains activated, Ixl will therefore be the dominant phonemic
response. In other words, the lexical effect rises over time and then
remains stable (or may even continue to increase in magnitude); it
does not die away over time. We assumed that the same would be
true for sentence context effects. That is, if they are due to
feedback, they should take time to build up (higher level processes
may need time to complete), but they should not die rapidly away.
Once feedback from the sentential level of processing has acted to
modify phonological representations (at either the lexical or pre-
lexical level), those modifications should continue to influence
responses made after that time.
If, on the other hand, sentential context effects are the result of
a decision bias, predictions about their time course are much less
clear. The effects could have a limited time course or could be very
stable over time, or they could increase or decrease over time. The
reason is that, although a decision bias can influence responses at
one moment in time, this influence has no necessary effect on
responses later in time. Because the decision bias does not modify
the bottom-up encoding of speech, the coding of the information in
the signal remains available to influence later processing and, thus,
influence decisions made later in time. In a model with feedback,
however, the bottom-up information tends to be overwritten by the
feedback from higher levels; this is why feedback models predict
that context effects should not die away over time.
We also examined the time course of the effect at a more
macroscopic level, through manipulation of the relative position of
the biasing information in the sentential context and the target
words. This analysis followed that of Connine et al. (1991). They
asked listeners to categorize word-initial phonemes in continua
such as dent-tent. However, in contrast to other studies on sen-
tential context effects, the biasing sentential information appeared
after the target word (e.g., in When the [?ent] in the fender was
well camouflaged, we sold the car). Connine et al. manipulated the
distance between the target word and the biasing information.
They found a sentential context effect when this information
appeared three syllables after the target word but not when it
appeared six to eight syllables after the target. In the present study,
we sought to examine the temporal limitations of such effects
further. As we discuss later, the temporal pattern that we observed
places strong constraints on theoretical accounts of the effect.
We chose function words as the target words for this investiga-
tion. We believed that function words were likely to provide us
with the strongest sentential context effects. The studies reviewed
earlier used content words as targets and manipulated primarily
semantic congruity effects. Although in some cases semantic con-
gruity can exert a strong effect (it is a rare coat that can be milked;
Borsky et al., 1998), the effect is not always absolute (if a tent is
in a trailer, one can drive the car with the tent; Connine, 1987). Our
use of function words as targets allowed us to manipulate the
absolute syntactic requirements for certain function words in cer-
tain syntactic frames. In fact, the study of Isenberg et al. (1980)
with which we began this article looked at exactly this case: We
tried [?a] gold versus We tried [?a] go. One may predict very
strong effects in this situation. If the context demands that the be
present (and not to), not only for the sentence to make sense but
also for it to be grammatical, why would one want to identify that
word in any other way? Unfortunately, the study by Isenberg et al.
remains unpublished, so the size of the effect they observed is
unclear. Furthermore, it seems that they did not analyze the time
course of the effect.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 was therefore an attempt to replicate the Isenberg
et al. (1980) study but with the addition of a time-course analysis.
The experiment was carried out in Dutch, in which a function word
continuum from te (to) to de (the) could be constructed by manip-
ulating the voicing of the initial stop consonant: [ta]-[d3]. We
selected an unambiguous plural noun, schoenen (shoes), that can
be preceded by the definite article de but not by the infinite marker
te; an unambiguous verb infinitive, schieten (to shoot), that can be
preceded by te but not by de; and another word, schaatsen, that can
be either a plural noun (skates) or an infinitive verb (to skate) and
thus can be preceded by both de and te. These three words were
then placed in the same sentence context:
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1. Ik probeer te/de schoenen
(I try to/the shoes; de biased)
2. Ik probeer te/de schieten
(I try to/the shoot; te biased)
3. Ik probeer te/de schaatsen
(I try to/the skate[s]; ambiguous).
We predicted that there would be a strong sentential context
effect (more te decisions in the second sentence than in the first).
As described earlier, we also predicted that if this effect were due
to feedback, it would not become weaker in slower responses. If
anything, an effect due to feedback should build up over time, as
more contextual information becomes available. The final sentence
was ambiguous; both the plural noun phrase reading (with de) and
the infinitive reading (with te) are acceptable. We therefore pre-
dicted that there would be more te decisions in the final sentence
than in the first sentence, but fewer than in the second sentence.
Method
Participants. Twenty-six volunteers from the Max Planck Institute
participant pool were paid to take part in this experiment. Al! were native
speakers of Dutch, and none reported any hearing loss.
Stimulus construction. The three sentences were recorded several
times by Petra van Alphen (a female native speaker of Dutch) in a
sound-damped booth onto digital audio tape (sampling at 48 kHz with
16-bit resolution). The utterances were digitized at a sample rate of 16 kHz
through the ESPS speech editing system with Xwaves. One production of
the function word te and one production of the function word de were
excised and used to create an eight-step continuum from te to de. The
difference between a Dutch [t] and [d] is mainly caused by a difference in
voice-onset time (VOT) and by a difference in the duration of the burst: A
[d] has a negative VOT and a short burst, whereas the burst for a [t] is
longer and the VOT is positive. Step 1 of the continuum (a clear [is])
consisted of 89 ms of silence, the release burst and following noise from
the [t] (34.1 ms), and then the schwa of the excised de (36.6 ms). For each
subsequent step along the continuum, the noise portion was reduced by 3.8
ms, and the silence was reduced by 11 ms (except for Step 8, in which the
silence was reduced by 22 ms to obtain a [d] with no silence). From Step
5 onward, an additional voiced period of 4.5 ms excised from de was
inserted between the silence and the release burst. That is. Step 8 had no
silence, four periods of voicing, and 7.5 ms of noise followed by the schwa.
To obtain smooth transitions between the combined parts, we spliced each
part at a zero crossing.
All members of the continuum were placed in three different carrier
sentences, each with the same beginning but with different endings. The
beginning of each sentence (iJfc probeer) was acoustically identical. The
ending was one of the three words schoenen, schieten, or schaatsen. In this
way, two biased sentences and one ambiguous sentence were obtained. The
combination of these three carrier sentences and the eight members of the
continuum resulted in 24 sentences. All sentences sounded natural, and
none contained any audible discontinuities.
Procedure. Sentences were presented binaurally over headphones at a
comfortable listening level. Every sentence was presented 20 times to each
listener. Two randomized lists of all 480 sentences were constructed. One
of the lists was presented to half of the listeners, and the other list was
presented to the other half. Listeners were tested in separate carrels in a
quiet room in groups varying from 1 to 4. They were asked to decide as fast
as possible whether they had heard te or de by pressing one of two buttons
of an appropriately labeled response box. Half of the listeners used their
writing hand to press the de button, and the other half used their writing
hand to press the te button. There was an interval of 1,500 ms between the
sentences in which listeners had to make their decisions. RTs were mea-
sured from the beginning of the schwa of the function word, that is, the
point moving through each step of the [t3]-[da] continuum at which all
eight steps became acoustically identical. Before the experiment began,
there was a training session of 12 sentences; each sentence was presented
carrying the clear stimuli from the endpoints of the continuum and two
ambiguous stimuli from the middle of the continuum. Listeners were
informed that some of the sentences could be ungrammatical. They were
offered a short rest break in the middle of the experiment.
Results and Discussion
The percentage of voiceless responses was computed for each
listener as a function of stimulus continuum and sentence bias. The
identification functions, pooled across participants, are shown in
the upper panel of Figure 1. The endpoints of the continuum were
labeled uniformly, demonstrating that they were clear, unambigu-
ous exemplars of the target words te and de. As is evident from
Figure 1, the responses of the listeners were influenced by the
sentence context, especially in the category boundary region.
There were more te responses in the re-biased sentence and more
de responses in the de-biased sentence. The ambiguous sentence







-O~ schieten (re biased)
-O- schaatsen (ambiguous)
-&- schoenen {de biased)













Figure 1. Mean percentage te responses in Experiment 1 in each of the
three sentential contexts across the stimulus continuum (upper panel) and
in the ambiguous region (Steps 3-6; lower panel).
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The size of the shift of the curves was measured by calculating
the area beneath each curve in the boundary region (see Pitt &
Samuel, 1993). The boundary region was defined as extending
from Step 3 to Step 6. For each sentence and for every participant,
the proportion of re identifications for these four stimuli was
calculated. The mean percentages of te responses in the ambiguous
region in each sentence context are shown in the lower panel of
Figure 1. Next, the proportions of te responses for each participant
in each context were converted through an arcsine transformation
(Studebaker, 1985). The mean values for the de-biased sentence,
the re-biased sentence, and the ambiguous sentence were 1.64,
1.84, and 1.76, respectively. A one-way repeated measures anal-
ysis of variance (ANOVA) on these transformed proportions
showed a significant effect of sentence bias, F(2,50) = 21.47, p <
.001. A post hoc Tukey honestly significant difference (HSD) test
showed that all of the pairwise differences among the three con-
ditions were significant at the .05 level.
Each listener's responses to each step along the stimulus con-
tinuum were ranked and divided into three groups: the fastest,
medium, and slowest thirds. Mean RTs for these three groups
were, respectively, 366 ms (SD = 127 ms), 500 ms (SD = 155
ms), and 714 ms (SD = 270 ms). As in the overall analysis, for
each participant the proportion of te responses across Steps 3,4,5,
and 6 was calculated for the sentences in each RT range. The mean
proportions of te responses in the ambiguous region, for each
sentence context and each RT range, are plotted in Figure 2. Each
participant's proportional data in each condition and each RT
range then underwent an arcsine transformation. The means of
these values were 1.71 (de biased), 2.01 (te biased), and 1.84
(ambiguous) for the fast RT range; 1.64 (de biased), 1.86 (te
biased), and 1.72 (ambiguous) for the medium RT range; and 1.59
(de biased), 1.69 (te biased), and 1.72 (ambiguous) for the slow RT
range.
In the fast and medium ranges, there were significant effects of
sentence bias, F(2, 50) = 11.06, p < .001, and F(2, 50) = 7.44,
p < .001, respectively. The outcomes of Tukey HSD tests showed
that all sentences differed significantly from each other in the fast
range. Of the 26 participants, 22 (85%) made more te responses in
the re-biased sentence than in the de-biased sentence. In the me-
dium range, the re-biased sentence differed significantly from the
de-biased sentence and from the ambiguous sentence. The differ-
ence between the de-biased sentence and the ambiguous sentence
was not significant. Again, 22 participants produced more re
responses in the re-biased sentence than in the de-biased sentence.
In the slow range, the sentence bias effect was not significant.
Only 16 participants (62%) made more re responses in the re-
biased sentence than in the de-biased sentence. Thus, the effect
was strongest in the fast RT range and became weaker in the slow
RT range.
In summary, there were more re responses to the verb-final
sentence than to the noun-final sentence, and responses to the
ambiguous sentence were intermediate. Furthermore, the contex-
tual effect changed over time: It was strongest in the fast RT range
and became weaker as responses became slower (such that it was
no longer statistically reliable in the slow RT range). One possible
reason for this RT effect is that contextual information can be used
by listeners only within a limited time window. If syntactic pro-
cessing is complete before the identification decision is reached,
























(te biased) (ambiguous) (de biased)
Slow RT range
schieten scbaatsen schoenen
(te biased) (ambiguous) (de biased)
Figure 2. Mean percentage te responses in Experiment 1 in each of the
three sentential contexts in the ambiguous region, plotted separately for
each of the three reaction time (RT) ranges.
decisions. Note that it is not the case that the task became easier in
slower responses; the ambiguous steps remained ambiguous (see
Figure 2). This means that listeners could, in principle, still use the
contextual information to bias their decisions, but they tended not
to do so. Note also that it is not the case that the possible sentential
bias becomes weaker in slower responses. By the time slow
responses were being initiated, listeners had heard all of the
sentences. Furthermore, the biases in these sentences did indeed
influence the faster decisions. Thus, the weaker effects in slower
responses must have occurred either because participants chose not
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to use the information to help them with a difficult decision (which
seems unlikely) or because the information simply was unable to
influence the decision.
This account is inconsistent with the view that sentential context
exerts its effect through feedback. If feedback had acted to modify
lexical and phonological encoding processes (as the faster re-
sponses might suggest), then it would not be possible for the
effects of this feedback to disappear in slower responses. After
phonological representations have been altered, responses made on
the basis of those representations should show the effects of that
alteration whether they are fast or slow.
Another possibility is that slow responses reflect the operation
of RT deadline processes. Participants are required to respond as
fast as possible, that is, before some deadline. If no identification
decision has been reached when the deadline occurs, particularly
on the most ambiguous tokens of the stimulus continuum, re-
sponses may then be initiated at random. Such responses would
tend to cancel out any contextual bias in the slow responses (see
McQueen, 1991, for a similar argument about the disappearance of
lexical context effects in slow word-final phonetic categoriza-
tions). Note, however, that the responses remained orderly in the
slow range. Responses at the endpoints were more or less unani-
mously correct (te endpoint, 97% te responses on average; de
endpoint, 1 % te responses on average) and, as shown in Figure 2,
those in the ambiguous region were close to chance. In other
words, listeners were not responding at random in the slow RT
range. It is therefore unlikely that the absence of a significant bias
effect in the slow range was due only to the effects of deadline-
based responses.
Experiment 2
If sentential context has no influence on slow responses because
syntactic analysis is completed, it may also have no influence on
fast responses when syntactic analysis cannot yet begin, that is,
before disambiguating information has arrived. We therefore
tested the time constraints of the syntactic bias further in Experi-
ment 2, using sentences in which the disambiguation appeared
later than in Experiment 1. We used the ambiguous word schaat-
sen from Experiment 1 but with three different following prepo-
sitional phrases. The first was biased toward the nominal reading
of schaatsen, and the second was biased toward the verbal reading.
The third phrase maintained the ambiguity. The three sentences
were:
4. We proberen te/de schaatsen van mijn broer
(We try to/the skates of my brother; de biased)
5. We proberen te/de schaatsen op noren
(We try to/the skate on racing skates; te biased)
6. We proberen te/de schaatsen zonder sokken
(We try to/the skatefs] without socks; ambiguous).
We predicted that the contextual bias would build up over time;
that is, no bias would be present in the fastest responses (before the
disambiguation was processed), but bias would emerge in the
slowest responses (once the disambiguation had been processed).
It was, of course, possible that listeners would make all of their
decisions without waiting for the following context. It was thus
possible that there would be no contextual effects whatsoever.
Method
Participants. Twenty-six volunteers from the Max Planck Institute
participant pool took part in this experiment, in exchange for pay. All were
native speakers of Dutch without any hearing loss. None had participated
in Experiment 1.
Stimulus construction. The three sentences were recorded and digitized
through the same procedure as in Experiment 1. Because the continuum
from te to de that was constructed for Experiment 1 was acoustically
inappropriate in the Experiment 2 contexts, a new continuum had to be
constructed. Other than differences in the exact duration of the different
parts, stimulus construction was identical to that of Experiment 1, except
that the amplitude of the voiced periods of the /d/ had to be anenuated (to
obtain a smooth transition from the silent interval to the voiced part of the
stimuli). Parts of the recorded sentences were combined such that the three
carrier sentences were acoustically identical up to the end of schaatsen.
The sentences differed only in their endings. As before, the eight steps of
the continuum were placed in the three carrier sentences, resulting in 24
sentences.
Procedure. Except for the following changes, the procedure for Ex-
periment 2 was identical to that of Experiment 1. Participants were tested
in sound-damped booths. The 480 sentences were randomized in 20 blocks;
each block contained the 24 different sentences in different random orders.
Results and Discussion
The identification curves for the responses in Experiment 2 are
plotted in the upper panel of Figure 3. There are minimal visible
differences among the three curves. The only effect is that the
de-biased sentence is slightly shifted to the left relative to the other
two sentences. As before, the proportion of te responses for Steps
3 to 6 of the stimulus continuum was calculated for each context
and each participant (see the lower panel of Figure 3) and trans-
formed by means of an arcsine transformation. The mean arcsine
values were 1.75 (de biased), 1.79 (te biased), and 1.81 (ambigu-
ous). An ANOVA revealed that the small bias effect was signifi-
cant, F(2, 50) = 3.31, p < .05. A Tukey HSD test showed that
only one shift was reliable: There were significantly fewer te
responses in the de-biased sentence than in the ambiguous
sentence.
The data for each participant were partitioned into thirds in the
same way as in Experiment 1. The mean RTs of the responses in
the fast, medium, and slow RT ranges were, respectively, 303 ms
(SD = 98 ms), 424 ms (SD = 125 ms), and 663 ms (SD = 315
ms). The mean percentages of te responses in the ambiguous
region for each context and each RT range are plotted in Figure 4.
There were no differences among the three contexts in the fast RT
range, but in the slow RT range there was a small difference
between the de-biased sentence and the te-biased sentence: There
were a few more te responses in the re-biased sentence than in the
de-biased sentence. The mean arcsine-transformed proportions in
each RT range were 1.92 (de biased), 1.92 (te biased), and 1.97
(ambiguous) for the fast RT range; 1.74 (de biased), 1.70 (te
biased), and 1.79 (ambiguous) for the medium RT range; and 1.62
(de biased), 1.76 (te biased), and 1.68 (ambiguous) for the slow RT
range. ANOVAs showed that there was no significant bias effect
in any of the three RT ranges. However, in the slow RT range, the
effect was almost significant, F(2,50) = 3.05, p = .056; there was
thus a trend in the expected direction. A Tukey HSD test showed
that the difference between the de-biased sentence and re-biased
sentence in the slow RT range was significant at the .05 level. The
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Figure 3. Mean percentage te responses in Experiment 2 in each of the
three sentential contexts across the stimulus continuum (upper panel) and
in the ambiguous region (Steps 3-6; lower panel).
numbers of participants showing a context effect (more te re-
sponses in the te-biased sentence than in the de-biased sentence) in
each RT range were as follows: fast, 9 (35%); medium. 14 (54%);
and slow, 18 (69%).
As was predicted, the sentential context effect was very small
and was due only to responses in the slowest RT range. This
finding suggests that the results of Experiment 1 were not due to
deadline-based responses. The listeners in Experiment 2 were
placed under the same amount of time pressure as those in Exper-
iment 1, yet, in contrast to the Experiment 1 participants, they
showed the strongest contextual bias effect in their slowest re-
sponses. The presence of an RT deadline therefore does not seem
to play a large role in determining the strength of sentential bias
effects.
The combined results of Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that
syntactic bias has a limited time window of effectiveness. Al-
though the listeners in Experiment 2 could have waited for the
disambiguating context, they tended not to and so did not use
sentential information in their faster responses. Likewise, although
the listeners in Experiment 1 had already processed the full sen-
tence, they tended not to use the sentential information in their
slower responses. The first of these temporal constraints almost
certainly involves in part a strategic choice (i.e., a choice not to
wait for the following information, even though listeners knew that
it would be disambiguating in two thirds of the trials). The second
constraint, however, seems not to involve a strategic choice: Why
would one not use useful information to help make a difficult
decision (especially when one does use that information in one's


























(te biased) (ambiguous) (de biased)
Figure 4. Mean percentage te responses in Experiment 2 in each of the
three sentential contexts in the ambiguous region, plotted separately for
each of the three reaction time (RT) ranges.
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not used to bias slow decisions therefore appears to be a constraint
of the automatic processing machinery; if syntactic processing is
complete, it may be unable to bias identification decisions.
An interesting question therefore arises: What happens when the
disambiguating context appears before the function words? If
syntactic processing is completed before even the fastest responses
can be initiated, there may be no effect (i.e., as tended to occur in
the slow responses in Experiment 1). On the other hand, one might
predict an effect in the faster responses that then dies out in the
slower responses (i.e., as in Experiment 1). Yet another possibility,
however, is that the bias effects will build up over time (as in
Experiment 2); if syntactic processing takes time to complete,
there may be no output available when the fastest decisions are
made. A final possibility is that there will be strong and stable
effects in all RT ranges. Because the disambiguating context
precedes the function words, listeners are in a position to use it to
maximum effect in their identification decisions.
Experiment 3
Experiment 3 therefore tested identification of re and de in three
sentences in which the disambiguation appeared in the verb before
the [?a] continuum:
7. We verkopen te/de schaatsen
(We sell to/the skates; de biased)
8. We durven te/de schaatsen
(We dare to/the skate; te biased)
9. We proberen te/de schaatsen
(We try to/the skatefs]; ambiguous).
After the verb verkopen, the definite article de is possible, but
the infinitive marker te is ungrammatical. The only possible con-
tinuation with te would be that in which it is an intensifier (too), as
in an adverbial phrase (We verkopen te veel [We sell too much]).
But this reading of te is rendered ungrammatical in the context of
the following plural-infinitive schaatsen. The disambiguation is
therefore almost, but not entirely, due to verkopen. After the verb
durven, both de and te are in fact possible, but the reading with de
is made ungrammatical when the sentence ends with schaatsen (it
would be possible to continue the sentence with a de, as in We
durven de schaatsen te verkopen [literally, We dare the skates to
sell]). Given that the sentences always ended with schaatsen and
that te never appeared in the experiment as an intensifier, listeners
were able to disambiguate [?a] on the basis of the preceding verbs
in the first two sentences. The final sentence was ambiguous (as in
Experiments 1 and 2, proberen can take both de schaatsen and te
schaatsen).
Method
Participants. Twenty-six volunteers from the Max Planck Institute
participant pool were paid for taking part. They were all native speakers of
Dutch and did not report any hearing loss. None had taken part in the
earlier experiments.
Stimulus construction. The three sentences for this experiment were
recorded at the same time as the materials for Experiment 2. The carrier
sentences were again constructed in such a way that those parts that
were present in all three carrier sentences were acoustically identical.
The verb of the sentences differed and determined the bias toward te or
de. The verb proberen in the ambiguous sentence was acoustically the
same as the verb used in all three carrier sentences in Experiment 2. The
continuum from Experiment 2 was slightly altered by using another
production of the schwa to obtain a more natural intonation pattern, and
it was placed in the three carrier sentences.
Procedure. The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 2.
Results and Discussion
Figure 5 shows the overall identification functions for the three
carrier sentences (upper panel) and the mean percentages of te
responses in the ambiguous region (Steps 3, 4, 5, and 6; lower
panel). The figure displays a pattern different from any of those
predicted; there were fewer te responses to stimuli in the ambig-
uous carrier sentence than in the de-biased and re-biased sentences.
The curves do not show any difference between the de-biased and
re-biased sentences. The arcsine values that were used in the
ANOVAs were calculated in the same way as in previous exper-
iments. The mean values were 1.76 (de biased), 1.76 (re biased),
and 1.56 (ambiguous). The bias effect was significant, F(2, 50) =
19.12, p < .001. A Tukey HSD test showed that the ambiguous
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Figure 5. Mean percentage te responses in Experiment 3 in each of the
three sentential contexts across the stimulus continuum (upper panel) and
in the ambiguous region (Steps 3-6; lower panel).
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There was no significant difference between the de- and re-biased
sentences.
The data for each participant were partitioned into thirds in the
same way as in the previous experiments. The mean RTs for the
fast, medium, and slow RT ranges were, respectively, 325 ms
(SD = 119 ms), 438 ms (SD = 140 ms), and 621 ms (SD = 248
ms). The mean percentages of re responses in the ambiguous
region for each context and each RT range are plotted in Figure 6.
The data in the three RT ranges show the same pattern as in the
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Slow RT range
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Figure 6. Mean percentage te responses in Experiment 3 in each of the
three sentential contexts in the ambiguous region, plotted separately for
each of the three reaction time (RT) ranges.
sentences than in the ambiguous sentence. Mean arcsine values
(calculated in the same way as before) for each sentence and each
RT range were 1.84 (de biased), 1.95 (te biased), and 1.66 (am-
biguous) for the fast RT range; 1.84 (de biased), 1.74 (te biased),
and 1.55 (ambiguous) for the medium RT range; and 1.62 (de
biased), 1.56 (te biased), and 1.46 (ambiguous) for the slow RT
range. The bias effect was significant in all three RT ranges: F(2,
50) = 6.03, p = .005, in the fast RT range; F(2, 50) = 14.62, p <
.001, in the medium RT range; and F(2, 50) = 5.15,p < .01, in the
slow RT range. Tukey HSD tests showed that these effects were
due to significant differences between the ambiguous sentence and
the two biased sentences in all three RT ranges.
There was no effect of sentential context between the de- and
re-biased sentences in any RT range. There was, however, a bias
toward de in the ambiguous sentence in all three RT ranges. Why
might this have occurred? One possibility is that the verb proberen
was not perfectly ambiguous. It may be that proberen followed by
a direct object noun phrase (the skates) is preferred over proberen
with an infinitive verb complement (to skate), perhaps because the
direct object reading occurs more often. A post hoc test examined
this possibility.
In this test, 15 participants were asked to complete ten written
sentences in which the word te or de was deleted. All ten of the
sentences were of the same structure used in Experiment 3 (i.e.,
they all ended with a word that was ambiguous between a noun
plural and an infinitive verb). Three of the sentences were ambig-
uous, including We proberen schaatsen. The other seven
sentences contained main verbs that rendered the sentences unam-
biguous, including verkopen and durven. Results showed that all
participants wrote down de after verkopen and te after durven. In
the ambiguous sentence We proberen schaatsen, two
thirds of the participants preferred the word de. The test showed
that verkopen and durven were well chosen, in that they had the
predicted biases, but that proberen did indeed have a de bias. This
is not sufficient, however, to explain the pattern of results in
Experiment 3. If both proberen and verkopen had de biases, both
of these conditions should have been different from the durven
condition in Experiment 3.
An important difference between proberen and verkopen, how-
ever, is that although both have a de bias, proberen does not
mandate that the word before schaatsen be de, whereas verkopen
does. Syntactic processing could be completed early given unam-
biguous items, particularly in an experiment with many repetitions
of the same verbs. In principle, after listeners had learned the small
set of test sentences, they could select the appropriate verb on the
basis of the first phoneme after we and then immediately begin
syntactic processing. Syntactic analysis of the unambiguous verbs
may thus have been completed early and hence may not have
influenced the te-de decision. But because of the inherent ambi-
guity of proberen, syntactic processing may have been slower to
complete so that there was a de bias in categorization spread out
over the RT ranges. If this argument is correct, then it should be
possible to find an effect with unambiguous preceding contexts if
these contexts are more varied. In other words, if syntactic pro-
cessing cannot be completed unusually early, an effect on te-de
labeling should be found. Experiment 4 tested this hypothesis
using the same three kinds of sentences as in Experiment 3 but
with more verbs in each condition.
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Experiment 4
Method
Participants. Twenty-six native speakers of Dutch from the Max
Planck Institute participant pool were paid for taking pan. None reported
any hearing loss, and none had participated in any of the earlier
experiments.
Stimulus construction. Twenty-five sentences were recorded. They
were similar to those used in Experiment 3 and are listed in the Appendix.
Ten of the sentences contained a de-biased verb, 10 sentences contained a
re-biased verb, and 5 sentences contained an ambiguous verb. Among these
were the verbs used in Experiment 3 (verkopen, durven, and proberen).
The sentences were recorded and digitized in the same way as before. In
each sentence, the first two words were excised and used as the sentence
onset. One exemplar of the word schaatsen was excised from one of the
recorded sentences and served as the last word for all 25 carrier sentences.
The te-de continuum used in Experiments 2 and 3 was also used here, but
with a different production of the schwa. Not all steps of the continuum
were used. As a means of preventing the experiment from becoming too
long, only the clear endpoints and the three most ambiguous steps (Steps
1, 4, 5, 6, and 8) were used. There were 125 different sentences in total.
Procedure. The procedure was identical to that of Experiments 2 and
3, except for the number of sentences. Listeners heard every step in each
of the rfe-biased and re-biased sentences three times, and they heard each
step in each of the ambiguous sentences six times. Thus, each condition
involved 150 responses per participant.
Results and Discussion
The upper panel of Figure 7 shows the overall identification
functions for the three conditions. There are clearly more te re-
sponses to stimuli in the re-biased carrier sentences than in the
de-biased sentences; the percentage of re responses to stimuli in
the ambiguous sentences lies in between. The proportion of te
responses for Steps 4, 5, and 6 of the stimulus continuum was
calculated for each participant (see the lower panel of Figure 7). As
before, an arcsine transformation was applied to these proportions.
The mean values for each condition were 1.58 (de biased), 1.90 (te
biased), and 1.71 (ambiguous). An ANOVA indicated that the bias
effect was significant, F(2, 50) = 20.77, p < .001. A Tukey HSD
test showed that all of the pairwise differences among the three
conditions were significant at the .05 level. Interestingly, an ex-
amination of performance on the individual sentences showed that,
in contrast to Experiment 3, there were more te responses in the
durven context than in the verkopen context. The durven context,
however, was not the most strongly re-biased context, nor was the
verkopen context the most strongly de biased. It is also important
to note that, as in Experiment 3, proberen produced a de bias
relative to both durven and verkopen. There was some variability
among the ambiguous sentences, suggesting that, as with prob-
eren, the verbs used in these sentences were not completely unbi-
ased. The average percentages of te responses in the ambiguous
sentences nevertheless fell between the averages for the two types
of unambiguous sentences.
As before, the responses to each step along the stimulus con-
tinuum were divided into thirds for each participant. Mean RTs for
the fast, medium, and slow RT ranges were, respectively, 351 ms
(SD = 105 ms), 484 ms (SD = 139 ms), and 684 ms (SD = 243
ms). As in the overall analyses, the proportions of te responses for
Steps 4, 5, and 6 for each condition and participant in each RT
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Figure 7. Mean percentage te responses in Experiment 4 in each of the
three sentential contexts across the stimulus continuum (upper panel) and
in the ambiguous region (Steps 4 -6 ; lower panel).
8. These proportions again underwent an arcsine transformation.
The mean arcsine values in each condition were 1.51 {de biased),
2.19 (te biased), and 1.86 (ambiguous) for the fast RT range; 1.62
(de biased), 1.92 (te biased), and 1.65 (ambiguous) for the medium
RT range; and 1.57 (de biased), 1.62 (te biased), and 1.62 (am-
biguous) for the slow RT range. ANOVAs showed that there were
significant bias effects in the fast and medium RT ranges, F(2,
50) = 24.99, p < .001, and F(2, 50) = 18.07, p < .001, respec-
tively. A Tukey HSD test indicated that, in the fast RT range, all
pairwise differences among the three conditions were significant.
Of the 26 participants, 25 (96%) made more te responses to the
re-biased sentences than to the de-biased sentences in the fast
range. In the medium RT range, the re-biased condition differed
significantly from the de-biased and ambiguous conditions.
Twenty-one participants (81%) made more re responses to the
re-biased sentences than to the de-biased sentences in the medium
range. There was no significant bias effect in the ANOVA for the
slow RT range. Only 12 participants (46%) produced more re
responses to the re-biased sentences than to the de-biased sen-
tences in the slow range.
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Figure 8. Mean percentage te responses in Experiment 4 in each of the
three sentential contexts in the ambiguous region, plotted separately for
each of the three reaction time (RT) ranges.
There was thus a significant effect of sentence context with the
unambiguous sentences that tended to weaken in slower responses.
The lack of such an effect in Experiment 3 appears to have been
due to the constrained nature of the task situation, which allowed
listeners to complete syntactic processing very early. In the more
varied situation in Experiment 4, syntactic processing was able to
influence the te-de decision, but again (as in Experiment 1) only
for a limited time.
General Discussion
Sentential context influences the identification of function
words, but only within a limited time frame. In Experiment 1,
when the disambiguating information in the sentence appeared in
the word following the ambiguous function word, listeners used
that information in their identification decisions but did so to a
greater extent in their fast responses than in their slow responses.
There were more te (to) decisions when the following word was an
infinitive verb (schieten [shoot]) than when the following word
was a plural noun (schoenen [shoes]). This effect was significant
in the fast and medium RT ranges but not in the slow RT range.
However, when the disambiguating information appeared one
word (two syllables) later in the sentences (in Experiment 2),
listeners used this information only in their slowest responses.
The last of these findings follows naturally from an analysis of
the task demands of Experiment 2 and thus probably reflects a
strategic choice on the part of the listeners. They were encouraged
to respond as fast as possible, and thus they tended to make their
te-de decisions without waiting to process the context after the
ambiguous word schaatsen (skatefs]). The biasing context in fact
began 541 ms after the beginning of the schwa of the function
word (i.e., 541 ms after the point at which RTs were measured).
The bulk of the responses in the fast and medium ranges (M = 303
ms and M = 424 ms, respectively) were therefore initiated before
any of the biasing context had been heard. Nevertheless, on those
trials in which listeners made their slowest responses, a context
effect was observed. That is, when they had heard information that
disambiguated schaatsen, they used that information to bias their
identification of the function word (the mean RT in the slow range
was 663 ms). Sentential context thus appears to bias word identi-
fication automatically, even when listeners appear to have adopted
a strategy of not waiting for the following context. We suspect,
however, that if more material than two syllables had intervened
between the function word and the onset of the disambiguation, no
context effect would have been found. Connine et al. (1991) found
no sentence context effect when disambiguation began six sylla-
bles after the target word. Under these circumstances, an insuffi-
cient number of responses are likely to be initiated after the
disambiguating information has been heard (if there are any such
responses at all).
In Experiment 1, listeners used the information in the following
context in their faster responses; however, even though they
clearly could have also used this information in their slower
responses (i.e., it was not the case that the information was not
available, as in the fast responses in Experiment 2), they did not do
so reliably. This result again suggests that the sentential context
effect is automatic rather than strategic. If listeners were using the
sentence context in a strategic way in their fast decisions, they
should have used it as well in decisions that happened to be slower.
It is also unlikely that this result reflects deadline-based responses.
Listeners identified the endpoint tokens accurately even in the
slow RT range. This suggests that the majority of slow responses
were not made at random, in response to an approaching RT
deadline. Furthermore, listeners were put under the same time
pressure in Experiment 2 and produced the largest contextual
effect in their slowest responses.
The results of Experiments 1 and 2 therefore suggest that the
effect of sentential context on function word identification is time
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limited, because the syntactic processing on which the effect
depends itself has a natural time course. If the disambiguation has
been fully integrated into the listener's interpretation of an utter-
ance, that information may then not be available to bias identifi-
cation decisions. On this account, sentential processing decisions
can be dissociated from decisions about the identity of ambiguous
words. A listener can thus decide that the appropriate word in a
sentence frame is de, for example, in Ik probeer [?a] schoenen,
given the need for a definite article before the plural noun. But, at
the same time, he or she can decide on the basis of the information
in the speech signal that the ambiguous word is sometimes te and
sometimes de. In other words, just as with the endpoint tokens (a
clear te will be identified as such even in a de-biased context),
identification of the phonological form of ambiguous words can be
independent of the sentential context. This appears to be the
tendency in the case of slow reactions in Experiment 1. We suggest
that when the faster responses in Experiment 1 were being initi-
ated, however, syntactic processing was usually not complete, so
the contextual bias in the sentence was able to influence the
identification decisions.
The results of Experiments 3 and 4, with preceding contexts,
support this account. One might have predicted that when the
disambiguation preceded the function words, strong effects of
context would be observed. There was, however, no effect due to
the biased contexts (verkopen and durven) in Experiment 3. We
argued that this was a consequence of the limited set of experi-
mental materials. When listeners could identify the biasing words
on the basis of their initial phoneme, and (in contrast to Experi-
ments 1 and 2) those words appeared before the function words, a
syntactic decision about which function word was appropriate
could be made very early, that is, early enough for that decision to
fail to influence the identification decision. The results in the
ambiguous condition of Experiment 3 were consistent with this
account. In all other experiments, the identification functions in the
ambiguous condition usually fell somewhere between the func-
tions for the two biased conditions. In Experiment 3, however,
there was a strong bias toward de responses in this condition. The
post hoc test showed that the ambiguous sentence did in fact have
a de bias; Dutch speakers preferred the sentence We proberen de
schaatsen (We try the skates) to We proberen te schaatsen (We try
to skate). But this bias is less extreme than with a verb such as
verkopen; te is syntactically incorrect in the verkopen sentence but
is grammatical and only dispreferred in the proberen sentence. We
suggested that the inherent ambiguity of proberen delayed syntac-
tic resolution and, thus, that the de bias was able to influence the
identification decisions.
In Experiment 4, a greater variety of sentences were used in
each condition. We hypothesized that increased variety in the
sentences would delay completion of syntactic processing and
would thus allow a sentence context effect to be observed in the te-
and de-biased conditions. This hypothesis was confirmed. There
were indeed more te responses in the /e-biased sentences than in
the <fe-biased sentences, with an intermediate proportion of te
responses in the ambiguous sentences. Furthermore, as in Exper-
iment 1, the sentential context effect became weaker in the listen-
ers' slower responses. It would again appear that the use of
sentential information in word identification is time limited. Even
though listeners could have used the sentence bias to assist in their
decisions about ambiguous words, they tended not to in their
slower responses.
Taken together, the present results suggest that sentential con-
text acts to bias decision making. This is the same conclusion
drawn by a number of other researchers who have examined the
influence of sentential context on the identification of content
words (Connine, 1987; Connine et al., 1991; Miller et al., 1984). It
also concurs with the conclusion drawn by Samuel (1981) on the
basis of data from phonemic restoration in content words. One
might have expected stronger effects with function words, given
that sentential context can impose an absolute constraint on the
grammaticality or ungrammaticality of a function word. Although
sentential context can impose quite strong constraints on the se-
mantic plausibility of particular content words, such constraints are
likely to be less "all or none." A sentential frame could of course
impose a syntactic constraint on the suitability of a content word in
a particular position, but such constraints have not yet been tested.
The fact that the context effects in the present experiments were
not particularly strong, along with the fact that the present results
lead to the same conclusion as that drawn from experiments with
content words, suggests that the current results do not stem from
the special status of function words.
We suggest that sentential context biases identification deci-
sions made at a dedicated decision-making stage. This stage of
processing is analogous to the level in the Merge model at which
phonemic decisions are made (McQueen et al., 1999; Norris et al.,
2000). In response to the experimental task at hand, listeners could
build representations for te and de in addition to the lexical
representations of these words used in normal word recognition.
The decision-level representations could receive input from the
lexical level but also from the sentential processing level. Given a
perfectly ambiguous input [?a], the lexical representations of te
and de would be activated equally and would pass equal amounts
of activation on to both decision units. Sentential context could
then bias the activation of these decision units. Note that although,
on this view, sentence context acts as a decision bias, this bias is
considered to be an automatic component of perceptual decision
making. It is not considered to be a postperceptual strategic bias.
Although it can be difficult to distinguish between different types
of bias, several aspects of our data suggest that sentence context
effects are automatic rather than strategic. If they were strategic,
one would expect to see a bias that was independent of the
stimulus continuum (i.e., a bias at the continuum endpoints that
was as large as the bias at the category boundary), and, as we have
already suggested, one would expect to see a bias that did not vary
as a function of RT. Neither of these effects were observed.
Our results suggest that sentence-level processing can bias the
te-de decision, but only if the identification decision is being made
at the same time as the syntactic structure of the utterance is being
resolved. If syntactic resolution occurs earlier than identification
(as in the biased sentences in Experiment 3 and in the slower RT
ranges in Experiments 1 and 4), or if resolution occurs later than
identification (as in the faster RT ranges in Experiment 2), no bias
in identification will be observed. One way of thinking about this
is in terms of an activation-based model (for example, Merge;
Norris et al., 2000). If the activation level of either the te or de
decision unit is below asymptote when syntactic resolution occurs,
contextual information can increase the activation of the unit that
is appropriate in that context, thus biasing identification. But if
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syntactic resolution occurs much earlier—that is, before the con-
textually appropriate unit has been activated—there will be no
sentence-level influence on the activation of that unit. Likewise, if
syntactic resolution occurs relatively late, identification responses
will either already have been initiated or the activation level of the
contextually appropriate decision unit will be so close to asymp-
tote that the contextual influence will no longer be able to modu-
late that decision.
Note that, on this view, bottom-up information is given priority
in perceptual identification. It has a stronger influence on the
activation of the decision units than does contextual information.
This assumption is also made in the Merge model with respect to
the relative weighting of bottom-up and lexical information in
phonemic decision making (Norris et al., 2000). In the present
study, we observed no influence of sentential context on the
stimuli at continuum endpoints in any experiment or any RT range.
This, we argue, is also because of the priority of bottom-up
information: The te or de decision unit is activated so strongly by
the unambiguous signal that sentential bias is unable to modify that
activation.
The implications of the current findings for models of spoken
word recognition are clear. Sentential context does not appear
to modulate the phonological encoding of spoken language,
contrary to the claims of Borsky et al. (1998). In other words,
there is no feedback loop by which the output of sentential
processing can influence processes at lexical or prelexical lev-
els. The account of the results in terms of a limited bias in
decision making that we have just outlined is consistent with
this claim. In such a model, there is no need for sentence-level
processes to modify lower levels of processing. Information
needs only to flow bottom-up through the recognition system.
On this point, we are in agreement with the majority of other
authors who have worked on this topic (Connine, 1987; Con-
nine et al., 1991; Miller et al., 1984; Samuel, 1981) but not with
the authors of the most recent article on the topic (Borsky et al.,
1998). As we argued in the introduction, however, the results of
Borsky et al. are in fact consistent with models of spoken word
recognition in which there is no feedback.
The present results challenge accounts of sentential context
effects based on feedback. If feedback acted to alter lexical or
prelexical processes (e.g., by changing the activation of word or
phoneme representations), then sentential context effects should
not have become weaker in slower responses (as in Experiments I
and 4). If, for example, the activation level of the lexical repre-
sentation for te were boosted by a sentence context biased toward
te, the effects of that change in activation should have been seen in
all responses made after the change. In particular, if such an
activation boost were the cause of the shift in identification seen in
fast responses, there should have been a similar shift (if not a
stronger one as more time elapsed with more feedback) in slow
responses. This is analogous to the effects of lexical context on the
activation of prelexical phoneme representations in the TRACE
model (McClelland, 1987; McClelland & Elman, 1986), in which
the benefit in activation of the lexically consistent phoneme due to
feedback remains strong until well after the acoustic offset of the
word.
It would, of course, be possible to build a model in which
feedback operated only for a limited time window. But note that,
in feedback models, the representations responsible for perceptual
decisions are also responsible for encoding speech. Once those
representations have been altered by feedback, the coding of the
input is distorted. Given [?a] in a re-biased context, for example,
the activation of te would be increased, and the activation of de
would be suppressed. This activation pattern would in turn bias the
activation of [t] and [d] nodes through feedback to the prelexical
level. The representations at the lower levels of the speech per-
ception system are thus modified by feedback such that they agree
with decisions made at higher levels in the system. In this way,
feedback tends to overwrite the information that was actually
present in the speech signal (Massaro, 1989; Norris et al., 2000). It
is therefore difficult for such a system to recover from the effects
of feedback. One way to undo these effects (and thus explain how
contextual effects tend to disappear in slow responses) would be to
store an additional representation of the speech signal in a separate
memory buffer and to feed this information back into the speech
recognition system once top-down feedback has switched off. This
does not strike us as very plausible.
An alternative would be to argue that feedback from senten-
tial levels of processing influences the lexical level but that the
lexical level does not then feed back information to the pre-
lexical level. The prelexical level would then be able to encode
an undistorted representation of the input that could be used to
re-inform the lexical level about the input when feedback was
switched off. Feedback, however, is usually seen as something
that benefits the word-recognition process (but see Norris et al.,
2000, for counterarguments). If feedback were beneficial, it is
unclear why it would operate at one stage of the recognition
system (from sentential to lexical levels) but not at another
(from lexical to prelexical levels) and why it would be time
limited.
The reason why the decision-bias account is not challenged by
the weakening of the sentential context effect in slower responses
is that the account makes a clear distinction between the represen-
tations used for perceptual decision making and those that encode
the speech signal (i.e., the prelexical and lexical representations
used in normal word recognition). A decision unit can be biased by
sentential context information at one moment in time, but this bias
can be undone as the bottom-up information is processed further.
In addition, the bias is seen as something that modifies explicit
identification decisions rather than something that modifies the
normal process of word recognition. It is thus quite plausible that
the bias would be time limited. Such a model can account for the
weakening of context effects in slower responses more readily than
a model with feedback, because there is no need in the bias model
to undo the effects of top-down feedback on lower level
representations.
We therefore suggest that there is bottom-up priority in percep-
tual decision making. Sentential constraints can certainly be used
by listeners in their interpretation of an utterance and, within time
limits, can also be used to bias word identification decisions. But
if the listener must make a decision about what a speaker actually
said (i.e., a phonological rather than syntactic-semantic decision),
then the speech signal should be king. This is possible in models
of spoken word recognition with no feedback. In such models,
decisions at the sentential level cannot distort representations of
the perceptual world.
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Sentences With a de-Biased Verb
We poetsen te/de schaatsen. (We polish to/the skates.)
We stelen te/de schaatsen. (We steal to/the skates.)
We lenen te/de schaatsen. (We borrow to/the skates.)
We ruilen te/de schaatsen. (We exchange to/the skates.)
We zoeken te/de schaatsen. (We look for to/the skates.)
We verkopen te/de schaatsen. (We sell to/the skates.)
We verstoppen te/de schaatsen. (We hide to/the skates.)
We dragen te/de schaatsen. (We wear to/the skates.)
We begraven te/de schaatsen. (We bury to/the skates.)
We breken te/de schaatsen. (We break to/the skates.)
Sentences With a re-Biased Verb
We durven te/de schaatsen. (We dare to/the skate.)
We beginnen te/de schaatsen. (We start to/the skate.)
We hopen te/de schaatsen. (We hope to/the skate.)
We besluiten te/de schaatsen. (We decide to/the skate.)
We beweren te/de schaatsen. (We claim to/the skate.)
We behoren te/de schaatsen. (We ought to/the skate.)
We denken te/de schaatsen. (We think to/the skate.)A1
Appendix
Materials for Experiment 4
We trachten te/de schaatsen. (We attempt to/the skate.)
We schijnen te/de schaatsen. (We appear to/the skate.)
We lijken te/de schaatsen. (We seem to/the skate.)
We plannen te/de schaatsen. (We plan to/the skate.)
Ambiguous Sentences
We proberen te/de schaatsen. (We try to/the skate[s].)
We vergeten te/de schaatsen. (We forget to/the skate[s].)
- We prefereren te/de schaatsen. (We prefer to/the skate[s].)
We weigeren te/de schaatsen. (We refuse to/the skate[s].)
We beloven te/de schaatsen. (We promise to/the skate[s].)
A1
 Literal translations are given throughout. In this case, the sentence
means "We think we are skating."
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